Table of Contents.

Tram Accident in Gothenburg, 1992.


Vasaplatsen in Gothenburg. The tram at line 7 has crashed at the tram stop.

On March 12, 1992, at 9:17 p.m., the tram at line 7 derailed at Vasaplatsen in Gothenburg. The tram came at high speed towards the tram stop. Many of those waiting at the stop were matchless when the tram crashed into them. 13 people were killed and 29 were injured


The tram's disastrous journey from Wavrinskys Plats
to Vasaplatsen.

The tram, of type M21, was heading in a southerly direction when it suddenly became powerless at Wavrinskys Plats. The cause was reported to be a contact wire failure. The track was powerless from Wavrinskys Plats and on in a southerly direction towards Södra Guldheden. The contact wire was intact from a point about 25 meters behind the tram and on towards Vasaplatsen. A traffic controller had begun the work on redirecting two other trams that were on the route behind the powerless tram. He was in contact with the traffic management via a communication radio.


Overview in a northerly direction to (X) Tram Stop Vasaplatsen.
(1.) The switch to Vasagatan was a so-called. backup switch. The traffic controller ordered the trams that stood behind the powerless tram to back down towards the switch and on towards (2.) Vasagatan. Then they could continue forward (3.) To Valand and Kortedala. The red arrows show the path of the tram.

The traffic controller had now arrived at the powerless tram at Wavrinskys Plats. The driver had previously ordered the passengers to disembark. The traffic controller saw that the tram was on a slope towards Vasaplatsen. He decided that it should be rolled back, about 25 meters, to enter under powered contact wire. To make this possible, he disconnected the tram's mechanical braking system. It had been automatically switched on when the tram became powerless.

.Knowledge of the tram's different braking systems is required for the continuation:

Electrodynamic brake.
The tram's electric motors provide braking power as the driver reduces the power supply to the motors. The braking power is highest when the speed is high. This brake has no effect in a powerless tram.

Mechanical brake.
This brake is described in a sketch from the accident report (see below).

Magnetic rail brake.
The function is based on the fact that brake shoes when braking are pulled to the rails by electromagnetic force and that the friction between brake shoes and rails gives a supplementary braking force to other braking systems. This brake has no effect in a powerless tram.

Emergency brake.
The driver can achieve maximum braking effect in an emergency situation by activating all the braking systems.
When a passenger pulls an emergency brake handle, the mechanical brake is activated.



The above sketch shows the function of the tram's mechanical braking system. To disconnect the brake on a wheel, there was a handle attached to a wire on the outside of the tram. When pulling the handle, a latch was released which disconnected the brake. The traffic controller conducted disconnecting on six pairs of wheels, i.e. a total of 12 wheels. Disconnecting the mechanical brake in this way from a powerless tram was a violation of the regulations. To restore the brake, supply of compressed air was required. Compressed air could not be produced when the tram was powerless.


Trams of the type M21. On the roofs of the trams the pantographs are visible.

While the traffic controller disconnected the mechanical brakes, the driver fixed the tram's pantographs. They were operated using compressed air. They had gone down when the power failure occurred. The driver mechanically hoisted the pantographs by pulling a wire.

The traffic controller ordered the driver to take a seat in the car at the back of the train. There was a space used when driving the tram backwards. That car would now be at the front in the direction of travel as the tram was reversed. The driver was instructed by the traffic controller to pull in an emergency brake handle when the tram entered under the powered contact wire. The purpose was to stop the tram and activate all important functions once the power was in place. Electric compressors would be started to produce the compressed air required to restore the mechanical brakes to the normal. When the tram was under powered contact wire, the driver pulled the emergency brake. He got no braking effect.  He then pulled two other emergency brake handles - without getting any braking effect. The tram now rolled uncontrollably. The driver moved to the driver's seat in the car which was now at the far back of the travelling direction. There he tried to activate the tram's electrical system. It failed. The distance between Wavrinskys Plats and Vasaplatsen is about 1,4 km. The fall height is about 47 m. When the tram approached the switch to Vasagatan the speed was about 100 km / h. There was no way for the tram to switch towards Vasagatan at this high speed. It derailed and continued straight ahead to the tram stop at Vasaplatsen. The distance from the switch to the tram stop is about 80 m. Of course, the speed slowed somewhat when the tram rolled on the street, but it was still high when it first crashed against the tram stop and then against a house wall. The tram collided with 12 cars during its journey towards Vasaplatsen. The driver of the tram cope with only minor injuries.

This CIA-led operation is V-marked. It is well planned. My suspicion is that a number of key people have been included in the planning. The power failure at Wavrinskys Plats was no accident. Someone in a central location in the traffic management has turned off the power when the tram had arrived at Wavrinskys Plats. This place was the optimal starting point for the operation. The track slopes along the entire route from Wavrinskys Plats to Vasaplatsen. The target was the people who were at the tram stop at Vasaplatsen. Derailing would certainly take place at the switch to Vasagatan. My assumption is that the traffic controller has not been included in the conspiracy. He has been familiar with the regulations regarding the mechanical brakes of the tram. He has been ordered from the traffic management to release the mechanical brakes to roll the tram under the power wire. When the driver pulled the emergency brake, it had no effect because the mechanical brakes were disconnected. When he tried to activate the electrical system it had no effect as the contact wire was powerless on the entire route down to Vasaplatsen.

Judicial aftermath.
Two years after the crash, the CEO of the Gothenburg's Tramways and the traffic controller was indicted. The crime classification was grossly abusive until the death of another and dangerous carelessness to the public. The traffic controller was convicted on all counts and sentenced to conditional sentence. The CEO was acquitted.

Here you can download the accident report:    Rapport_J_1992-1    (4,25 MB, all in Swedish)



A memorial to honour the victims of the disaster is installed
at Vasaplatsen.